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A recent model of collective action distinguishes two distinct pathways; an emotional pathway 
whereby anger in response to injustice motivates action, and an efficacy pathway where the 
belief that issues can be solved collectively increases the likelihood that group members take 
action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Research supporting this model has, 
however, focused entirely on relatively normative actions such as participating in 
demonstrations. The authors argue that the relations between emotions, efficacy and action differ 
for more extreme, non-normative actions and propose (1) that non-normative actions are often 
driven by a sense of low efficacy and (2) that contempt, which, unlike anger, entails 
psychological distancing and a lack of reconciliatory intentions, predicts non-normative action. 
These ideas are tested in three survey studies examining student protests against tuition fees in 
Germany (N = 332), Indian Muslims’ action support in relation to ingroup disadvantage (N = 
156), and British Muslims’ responses to British foreign policy (N = 466). Results were generally 
supportive of predictions and indicated that (a) anger was strongly related to normative action 
but overall unrelated or less strongly related to non-normative action; (b) contempt was either 
unrelated or negatively related to normative action but significantly positively predicted non-
normative action; and (c) that efficacy was positively related to normative action and negatively 
to non-normative action. The implications of these findings for understanding and dealing with 
extreme intergroup phenomena such as terrorism are discussed. 
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What is common to East Germans taking to the streets in 1989 to demand democratic reforms, 
British factory workers staging sit-in protests against planned redundancies, environmental 
activists ‘spiking’ trees to sabotage attempts to cut them down, and Palestinians bombing Israeli 
nightclubs in their struggle for national liberation is that people are acting on behalf of a group in 
order to achieve a group goal. According to Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990a), “a group 
member engages in collective action any time that she or he is acting as a representative of the 
group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (p. 995). Such 
action is often aimed at challenging group-based discrimination or group disadvantage, or at 
ending or preventing an injustice. As the examples above illustrate, collective action can take on 
many forms, ranging from relatively moderate and non-violent actions like taking part in 
peaceful demonstrations, signing petitions, or participating in acts of civil disobedience, to more 
radical forms such as sabotage, violence and terrorism. 
What mobilizes people to engage in collective action has been a key question in the 
social sciences (e.g., Blumer, 1939; Gurr, 1970, 1993; Klandermans, 1997) and the central focus 
of prominent psychological theories of group behaviour such as Relative Deprivation Theory 
(RDT; e.g., Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002) and Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). A vast amount of empirical research has examined the structural and 
psychological factors motivating collective action in a wide range of social contexts (for reviews 
see Klandermans, 1997; Wright, 2010; see also Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for a 
meta-analysis). Although this research has provided important insights into the processes 
underpinning collective action, it has paid little systematic attention to the different forms such 
action can take (for exceptions see Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984; Wright et al., 1990a) and 
has largely ignored more radical forms of group-based behaviour. Examining the factors driving 
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different action strategies is, however, essential for further theoretical development in the field 
(see Wright, 2009). Such work would also speak to recent efforts in psychological science to 
understand extreme intergroup phenomena such as terrorism (e.g., Reich, 1990; Victoroff & 
Kruglanski, 2009) and could afford vital information for practitioners and policy makers 
concerned with steering political action away from violent confrontation towards non-violent 
forms of engagement (Schwarzmantel, 2010).  
To address this gap in the literature, the present research systematically examines 
predictors of different forms of collective action. Specifically, we distinguish normative (i.e., 
action that conforms to the norms of the wider social system) from non-normative action (i.e., 
action that violates these rules1; Wright et al., 1990a) and utilize a recent integrative theoretical 
model that proposes two distinct pathways to collective action; an emotional pathway whereby 
anger in response to injustice motivates action, and an efficacy pathway where the belief that 
issues can be solved collectively increases the likelihood that group members take action (van 
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). We argue that the relations between emotion, 
efficacy and action differ for more extreme, non-normative actions. First, we propose that non-
normative actions are often driven by a sense of low (rather than high) efficacy. Second, rather 
than being driven primarily by anger, we propose that the experience of contempt, which entails 
psychological distance from its object and a lack of reconciliatory intentions (see Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007), predicts non-normative action. Before outlining our hypotheses in more detail, 
we summarize the work on the roles of emotion and efficacy in collective action.   
Predictors of Collective Action 
Injustice Appraisals and Group-based Anger 
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A common starting point of psychological approaches to collective action is that people 
respond to a sense of disadvantage, unjust treatment, or threat. RDT for example posits that 
people engage in collective action as a result of viewing their group as relatively deprived or 
disadvantaged in comparison with a reference group (e.g., Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; 
Runciman, 1966). Whether collective action occurs further depends on interpretations of the 
social structure (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Both RDT and SIT view issues of legitimacy and justice 
as central in this process and stress that ingroup disadvantage must be seen as illegitimate, unfair, 
or unjust (e.g., Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & 
Mielke, 1999). Work on RDT further stresses that feelings of deprivation, such as anger, 
resentment, and outrage are important in driving action (see Walker & Smith, 2002).  
This focus on emotional reactions is in line with recent work on Intergroup Emotion 
Theory (IET; Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; E.R. Smith, 1993). This approach is based on 
appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, & te Schure, 1989), which view emotion as a 
complex ‘syndrome’ that involves cognitions, subjective feelings, and behavioural tendencies. 
Using insights from Self-Categorization Theory (SCT, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987), IET posits that, in situations where individuals categorize as members of a 
social group, group-related events become self-relevant and arouse emotions together with their 
associated action tendencies (E.R. Smith, 1993). Thus, the appraisal that the ingroup has been 
treated unfairly or suffered an unjust disadvantage arouses feelings of (group-based) anger and 
evokes action tendencies to move against the offender. Consistent with this view, there is 
considerable empirical support for the link between injustice appraisals and anger (see Miller, 
2000; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropananzo, 1999), for the role of anger-related emotions in 
encouraging action against those responsible (Averill, 1983; Guimond & Dube-Simard, 1983; 
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Mackie et al., 2000; Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, & Fischer, 2007), as well as for the mediating 
role of anger in the relation between group-based appraisals and confrontational action 
tendencies (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2004).  
The Role of Group Efficacy 
Another line of research has put greater emphasis on pragmatic considerations and has 
highlighted the need for members of disadvantaged groups to believe that their group’s position 
is changeable (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1997; Martin et al., 1984). This idea is related to 
the notion of stability in SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which posits that the perceived instability 
of the group hierarchy is necessary for collective action to occur. While stability refers to the 
situational constraints for change, concepts such as agency (Gamson, 1992) or collective efficacy 
(Bandura, 2000) correspond more closely to the extent to which the ingroup is viewed as being 
capable of solving their problems (see Mummendey et al., 1999). Wright (2001) combined these 
factors in the concept of collective control, which results from both the belief that the intergroup 
context is responsive to action and from the perception that the ingroup has the abilities to effect 
change. The importance of instrumental factors has also been the focus of resource mobilization 
theories (e.g., Klandermans, 1997; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), which emphasize the presence of 
necessary resources as a key determinant of collective action. Indeed, in its most radical form, 
this approach argues that, if people have the resources for effective mobilization, they will 
engage in collective action irrespective of whether they feel that they have been unjustly treated 
(e.g., McCarthy & Zald, 1977; see also Martin et al., 1984). Consistent with this general 
approach, there is substantial evidence that the belief that one’s group is able to effect the desired 
change predicts engagement in collective action (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et 
al., 2004; see van Zomeren et al., 2008, for meta-analytic evidence). 
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Emotion and Efficacy as Dual Pathways to Collective Action 
Rather than viewing these different accounts as competing explanations, a recent dual-
pathway model conceptualizes emotion and efficacy perceptions as two distinct but 
complementary pathways to collective action. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) likened collective 
action through these pathways to emotion- and problem-focused coping with collective 
disadvantage, respectively (cf. Lazarus, 1991). They provided empirical evidence across three 
experimental studies showing that anger, which resulted from experiences of procedural injustice 
and opinion support from other group members, and perceived group efficacy, which was 
predicted by instrumental social support, independently predict collective action tendencies and 
thus constitute two separate explanatory pathways. Based on this integrative model, the present 
work examines emotion and efficacy perceptions as distinct predictors of group-based action. 
The Present Research 
The present research extends this previous work by considering a wider array of 
collective actions. How to classify different forms of action has been the subject of much 
controversy in the literature on political engagement (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991). For the purposes 
of the present study, we apply Wright et al.’s (1990a) well-known distinction between normative 
(i.e., action that conforms to the norms of the existing social system, such as political 
participation or peaceful protest) and non-normative (i.e., action that violates these rules, such as 
violence and terrorism) action. It should be noted, however, that this distinction roughly maps 
onto other taxonomies, including ‘within-system’ and ‘out-of-system’ political action (Sabucedo 
& Arce, 1991), activism vs. radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), and constitutional vs. 
extraconsitutional action (Hayes & McAllister, 2005).  
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Historical analyses of political campaigns suggest that groups sometimes use both types 
of action over the course of their existence (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), or in parallel (e.g., the 
‘ArmaLite and ballot box’ strategies of the Irish Republican Army, see Hayes and McAllister, 
2005). Radical subgroups have also at times developed out of wider social movements, such as 
the Red Army Faction which emerged from the West German student protest movement (see 
Aust, 2008). Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) have suggested that, at the individual level, 
normative vs. non-normative action constitute two independent dimensions of political action 
that follow from different sets of appraisals of the political situation. Supporting this view, they 
demonstrated that normative and non-normative action form two correlated but clearly separate 
factors (see also Corning & Myers, 2002). In this paper, we aim to expand our understanding of 
the appraisals and emotions underlying these different forms of collective action. Extending van 
Zomeren et al.’s (2004) dual pathway model, we examine two key ideas relating to these paths:  
Anger and Contempt as Predictors of Normative and Non-normative Collective Action 
First, we propose that anger should be related to normative but not non-normative action 
and that contempt would predict non-normative action. This argument follows from work on the 
functional differences between anger and contempt. Although anger and contempt are strongly 
related, co-occurring emotions that both imply negative appraisals of others’ intentions of (Frijda 
et al., 1989) and are ‘other-hostile’ (Izard, 1971), there are important differences between these 
emotions in terms of their development and implications for social relations (Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007). Fischer and Roseman (2007) provide evidence that anger tends to occur in 
more intimate relationships, where there is some degree of control over the other person, and 
where reconciliation is ultimately desired. Rather than leading to destructive action which would 
be maladaptive for relationships, anger tends to result in short-term (mostly verbal) attacks that 
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are aimed at changing the other person’s behaviour and will ultimately result in an improvement 
of the relationship (see also Averill, 1983). This is consistent with an approach to emotion which 
views anger as a constructive emotion that functions to correct wrongdoing and uphold accepted 
standards of conduct (see Averill, 1983; Weber, 2004).  
Fischer and Roseman (2007) demonstrated that contempt, on the other hand, occurs in less 
intimate relationships, where there is a perceived lack of control over the other person, and 
where reconciliation is no longer sought. They showed that contempt can occur in response to 
the same instances of behavior as anger does, but often develops on top of anger; that is, it results 
from prior incidents of anger with the same person that went unresolved. Contempt is associated 
with permanent changes in the beliefs about another person and negative dispositional 
attributions of the offending behavior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). In the context of intergroup 
relations, contempt was also shown to be related to outgroup dehumanization (Esses, Veenvliet, 
Hodson, & Mihic, 2008), which can legitimate extreme actions (see Staub, 1990). Contempt 
often results in derogation of the object of contempt, the deterioration of social relationships, and 
social exclusion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Thus, contempt leads to a (physical and 
psychological) distancing from the object of contempt. 
To our knowledge, contempt has not been examined as a predictor of political action in 
response to injustices, nor has anger been investigated as a predictor of non-normative action (an 
exception is a study by Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009, which did not, however, 
examine the unique effects of anger over and above contempt). Consistent with previous work on 
the role of anger in collective action (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004) and the view of anger as a 
constructive emotion (Averill, 1983; Fischer & Roseman, 2007), we expected anger to be 
positively related to normative collective action (Hypothesis 1), but to be unrelated to more 
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extreme, non-normative forms of action (Hypothesis 2). While contempt can result in actions that 
serve to remove the object of contempt from one’s environment and is often associated with 
withdrawal (Fisher & Roseman, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000), it has also been suggested that 
contempt can be associated with ‘move against’ action tendencies (see E.R. Smith, 1993). Given 
that feelings of contempt are associated with a lack of reconciliation intention, dehumanization, 
and moral exclusion, we propose that, in the presence of an injustice or a threat, contempt can 
result in more extreme actions against an offender. This possibility was also acknowledged by 
Fischer and Roseman (2007) who suggested that the presence of contempt may lead to 
particularly hostile reactions because attack tendencies are accompanied by extreme derogation 
and are not held in check by a desire to preserve social relationships. A psychological distancing 
from, and moral exclusion of, the object of contempt (which, in the context of political action 
could be the government, police, or an offending outgroup more generally) further undermines 
the need to adhere to social norms and moral standards when dealing with the offender. Given 
that non-normative action challenges the legitimacy of the current social system (see Wright, 
2010) and seeks radical social change and reorganization, contempt should play a key role in 
predicting such action. Thus, we predict contempt to be uniquely and positively related to non-
normative action tendencies (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, based on appraisal theories of emotion 
(Frijda et al., 1989; E.R. Smith, 1993), we expect both anger and contempt to be predicted by 
injustice appraisals, and injustice appraisals to be indirectly related to normative and non-
normative action via anger and contempt, respectively (Hypotheses 4a and 4b). 
Group Efficacy as a Predictor of Normative and Non-normative Action 
Our second key idea relates to the role of efficacy in predicting different forms of action. 
There is strong evidence from a large number of studies that efficacy is positively related to 
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collective action (see van Zomeren et al., 2008). As mentioned above, this evidence is, however, 
primarily based on studies examining relatively moderate, normative forms of action. We predict 
that while efficacy might be positively related to normative action (Hypothesis 5), it is likely to 
be negatively related to non-normative action (Hypothesis 6). That is, non-normative action 
should occur when individuals feel that their group is powerless to address an injustice or 
influence relevant political decisions. This might be because individuals feel that their group 
does not have access to the conventional channels of political influence (e.g., Wright, 2009; 
Wright et al., 1990a), is marginalized by the procedures of the existing political system (Gurr, 
1993; Schwarzmantel, 2010), or is too disorganized or unsupportive of the cause (see van 
Zomeren et al., 2004). Low efficacy can also ensue because the government (or other relevant 
powerful group) is unresponsive to (Bandura, 2000; Wright, 2001), or even oppressive of (Drury 
& Reicher, 2005; Reicher, 2004), attempts to change the situation.  
A number of findings are consistent with the idea that low efficacy drives more extreme 
forms of action. For example, Ransford (1968) demonstrated in the context of the Watts Riots in 
the United States that feelings of powerlessness and lack of control over events were positively 
correlated with willingness to engage in violence. Furthermore, Wright and colleagues showed in 
an experimental study that non-normative action was chosen when movement from a 
disadvantaged group to an advantaged group was completely closed (Wright et al., 1990a). These 
authors also demonstrated that lack of hope for an improvement of their position best 
distinguished participants who opted for non-normative from those who chose normative action 
(Wright et al., 1990b). Similarly, Scheepers, Spears, Doosje and Manstead (2006) demonstrated 
experimentally that stable (as opposed to unstable) low group status resulted in more provocative 
forms of bias (i.e., outgroup derogation), in particular directed at an outgroup audience (see also 
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Spears, Scheepers, & van Zomeren, 2010). Scheepers et al. referred to this as a ‘nothing to lose’ 
strategy, reasoning that the low status group had little to lose by reacting in a more provocative 
way, given that their situation was unlikely to change by doing nothing.   
It should be noted that we do not propose that non-normative action represents an 
irrational strategy. Rather, we suggest that non-normative action can be highly strategic and 
serve a number of functions, such as influencing wider public opinion, building a movement, and 
winning third parties for the cause (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006); for example by provoking the 
opponent into extreme counter-action (see Sedgwick, 2004). Thus, although the group as a whole 
might currently be seen as powerless and ineffective, non-normative action might unsettle the 
current political situation and thereby facilitate the conditions that could lead to social change in 
the long run (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Spears et al., 2010). 
One final issue to consider concerns the relation between efficacy and emotions. These 
variables were conceptualized as representing separate pathways to action in van Zomeren et 
al.’s (2004) model. Nonetheless, other theoretical models suggest that efficacy and emotions may 
be linked. For example, in appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), the strength or 
resources the self has relative to an offender is a key factor in whether anger occurs. Consistent 
with this idea, work on IET has demonstrated that collective support is positively related to anger 
(Mackie et al., 2000; but see van Zomeren et al., 2004, for an alternative interpretation of this 
finding). Furthermore, theorizing on the conditions fostering contempt suggests that contempt is 
associated with lack of control (Fischer & Roseman, 2007) and self-appraisals of weakness (E.R. 
Smith, 1993). Thus, efficacy may be negatively linked to contempt (but see Mackie et al., 2000, 
for inconsistent results). We recognize these alternative possibilities and therefore examine the 
relations between efficacy and emotions exploratively.  
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Overview of Studies 
Because it is difficult to assess actual collective action, in particular if it is non-
normative, like most past research (see van Zomeren et al., 2008) we used either own willingness 
to engage in action or support for different forms of action as dependent measures in the present 
research. Previous research has shown that behavioural intentions can be a useful proxy for 
actual behaviour (Webb & Sheeran, 2006) and that collective action intentions are good 
predictors of actual participation (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2009). Furthermore, attitudes towards different forms of action are important 
variables in their own right with considerable substantive importance. This has been illustrated in 
the terrorism literature, which suggests that public opinion plays an important role in actual 
terrorist activity (e.g., Krueger & Malečková, 2009; Mascini, 2006).  
We test our hypotheses in three diverse contexts and in relation to a range of different 
criterion variables. Study 1 was conducted in the context of student protests against tuition fees 
in Germany and examined injustice appraisals, anger, contempt and efficacy perceptions as 
predictors of students’ willingness to engage in normative and non-normative collective action. 
Study 2 examined our predictions in a different cultural context, namely Indian Muslims’ support 
for actions in relation to ingroup disadvantage. Study 3 was conducted in the context of British 
Muslims’ responses to British foreign policy towards Muslim countries. This study included a 
wider range of criteria (voting intentions, normative collective action intentions, and support for 
violence against military and civilian targets) and used an index of political efficacy rather than 
general group efficacy as a predictor.  
Study 1 
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The right to a cost-free university education has long been a given in German society 
until the German high court decided to overturn a ban on tuition fees in 2005. Each state can now 
decide whether its universities will charge for their services, and how much. The court ruling and 
plans to introduce fees were met with outrage and nationwide demonstrations by students. The 
present research was conducted in the context of student protests in the federal state of Hessen, 
where tuition fees were introduced in October 2006. Students in Hessen took a number of actions 
to oppose tuition fees, ranging from relatively normative actions such as participating in 
demonstrations and signing petitions, to more radical, non-normative, and illegal actions. These 
included non-violent actions such as blocking university buildings and highways and disturbing 
events and lectures, but also violent actions by a minority of students who set fires, destroyed 
property and attacked police (see Der Spiegel, 2007). The present study was conducted in 
January 2008, when a law suit against the constitutionality of tuition fees was underway and the 
future of tuition fees in Hessen was uncertain.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data were collected as part of an online survey posted to various email lists at several 
universities in Hessen, Germany. The survey was completed by 332 students (162 female, 146 
male, 24 unknown; mean age = 22.79, SD = 3.37) from a range of subjects. Items were presented 
in German. Upon completion, respondents were able to enter into a prize draw. 
Measures 
Injustice appraisals 
Injustice appraisals were measured by four items (α = .91): “The introduction of tuition 
fees is unfair”; “Tuition fees are socially unjust”; “The introduction of tuition fees is not 
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legitimate“; “The introduction of tuition fees is justified” (reverse-coded). Respondents indicated 
their agreement with these items using 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Efficacy  
Group efficacy was measured by four items (α = .84): “I think that students can stop the 
introduction of tuition fees”; “I think that students can successfully defend their rights”, 
“Students are strong as a group and can move a lot”; and “I think students have already lost the 
fight against tuition fees” (reverse coded). Respondents indicated their agreement with these 
items using 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
Anger 
To assess anger, respondents indicated their agreement with the items “I’m furious about 
the planned introduction of tuition fees” and “The introduction of tuition fees angers me” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; r = .88, p <.001). 
Contempt 
Contempt was assessed using two items: “I disdain people who advocate tuition fees” and 
“I detest people who advocate tuition fees” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The 
items were averaged to form an index of contempt (r = .87, p <.001). 
Action tendencies 
Respondents were asked to indicate how likely it is that they would participate in 16 
different actions against tuition fees in the future, all of which had occurred as part of the student 
protest in the past (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Principal components analysis yielded 
three components with Eigenvalues greater than 1 which accounted for 77.44 % of the variance. 
Loadings, after oblique rotation, showed that relatively normative actions (participate in 
discussion meetings, participate in plenary meetings, write flyers, sign the complaint against 
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unconstitutionality of tuition fees, street theatre, demonstrations) loaded primarily on the first 
component (>.55), clearly non-normative, violent actions (throw stones or bottles, arson attacks 
on university buildings, arson attacks on private property of responsible persons, attacks on 
police, attacks on responsible persons) loaded on the second component (>.89), and more 
moderate, non-violent non-normative actions (disturb events where advocates of tuition fees 
appear, block university buildings, block the highway) loaded on the third component (>.74). 
These three components were also identified in a previous study by Sabucedo and Arce (1991), 
who distinguished political participation that operates within the political system from violent 
and non-violent action that operates outside of the system. Two items (boycott tuition fees, go on 
strike) that had cross-loadings on both the normative and the non-violent, non-normative 
component were excluded from the analyses. The remaining items were averaged to yield 
composites of own likelihood to engage in normative action (α = .90), non-violent non-normative 
actions (α = .89), and violent non-normative action (α = .96). 
Results and Discussion 
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations are presented in Table 1.  
Preliminary Analyses and General Analytic Strategy 
Preliminary inspection of the data indicated substantial deviation from normality of our 
index of likelihood to engage in extreme non-normative action (skewness = 6.65, kurtosis = 
50.96). This is not surprising given the nature of this measure (see also Corning & Myers, 2002; 
Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Inverse transformation (see Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001) of this 
variable resulted in an improvement of the distribution, but deviation from normality remained 
problematic (skewness = 3.58, kurtosis = 12.45). Nonnormality can lead to spuriously low 
standard errors and therefore to regression paths that are statistically significant, although they 
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may not be so in the population. One approach to handling nonnormal data is the bootstrap 
method (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995), a resampling technique whereby multiple samples are 
drawn randomly, with replacement, from the original sample resulting in a bootstrap sampling 
distribution from which standard errors and confidence intervals are calculated (see Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993). Although the bootstrap sampling distribution operates in the same way as the 
sampling distribution in parametric inferential statistics, it is free from assumptions of normality 
(Byrne, 2009). Moreover, bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals for indirect effects 
are superior compared to standard ways of estimating standard errors of indirect effects like the 
Sobel Test (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Given the advantages of this 
technique, we decided to use bootstrapping for our main regression analyses in all studies. In all 
studies, our regression analyses treated action intentions (or support) as the criterion variables, 
injustice and efficacy perceptions as predictors and emotions (anger and contempt) as mediators. 
We also controlled for age and gender (all studies) and SES (Studies 2 and 3)2. We used Mplus 
5.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2007) to be able to estimate all relevant model parameters (total, 
direct, and indirect effects; cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2008) in one step. Complete results of all 
analyses are presented in Tables S1-S3 in the supplementary materials.  
The present analysis controlled for age and gender of respondents. Because there was a 
small amount of missing data (≤ 6%), we used full information maximum likelihood estimation 
(FIML; Enders, 2001a), which produces less biased results compared to more traditional 
methods to handle missing data such as listwise and pairwise deletion (Schafer & Graham, 
2002). We used bootstrap standard errors and bias corrected confidence intervals based on 5000 
re-samples for all parameter estimates (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; see Efron & Tibshirani, 1993, 
on advantages of bias-corrected confidence intervals). Enders (2001b) demonstrated that 
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bootstrapping improves results of FIML considerably, even under strong deviations from 
normality.  
Main Analysis: Injustice Perceptions, Efficacy, and Emotions as Predictors of Action Tendencies 
Consistent with previous research, appraisals of injustice of tuition fees significantly 
predicted feelings of anger (B = .82, SE = .04, p < .001; CI: .748/.902). Injustice perceptions 
were also positively related to feelings of contempt (B = .37, SE = .05, p < .001; CI: .277/.469). 
Anger predicted willingness to engage in normative (B = .38, SE = .08, p < .001; CI: .220/.531) 
and non-violent non-normative (B = .23, SE = .08, p = .006; CI: .060/.379) action, but was 
unrelated to violent non-normative action (B = .00, SE = .01, p = .742; CI: -.020/.012). 
Contempt, on the other hand, was unrelated to willingness to engage in normative (B = -.04, SE = 
.05, p = .452; CI: -.136/.057) and non-violent non-normative (B = .11, SE = .07, p = .127; CI: -
.029/.248) action, but significantly predicted willingness to engage in violent non-normative 
action (B = .02, SE = .01, p = .036; CI: .002/.034). The indirect effects of injustice appraisals on 
willingness to engage in normative (B = .32, SE = .06, p < .001; CI: .186/.436) and non-violent 
non-normative (B = .29, SE = .07, p = .005; CI: .050/.314) action via anger, and the indirect 
effect of injustice appraisals on violent non-normative action via contempt (B = .01, SE = .003, p 
= .058; CI: .001/.0143), were significant. There was also a significant direct relation between 
injustice appraisals and normative action (B = .20, SE = .08, p = .011; CI: .051/.360).  
To provide a stronger test of the idea that anger and contempt differentially predict 
normative and non-normative action, we also tested whether the differences in predictive power 
of anger and contempt for the different forms of action were significant. We did this by 
comparing a model where the paths in question were constrained to be equal with an 
unconstrained model and used the χ2 -difference (Steiger, Shapiro, & Browne, 1985) to evaluate 
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whether differences were significant. Because we distinguished 3 different types of action, we 
first compared a model that constrained the two non-normative actions to be equal with the 
unconstrained model. For the relation between contempt and action tendencies, there was no 
difference between this constrained model and the unconstrained model (∆χ2 = 2.32, df = 1, p = 
.13), indicating that the relation between contempt and these two forms of non-normative action 
were comparable. We then tested whether this model differed from a more restrictive model that 
constrained all three paths from contempt to action to be equal. This more restrictive model 
differed significantly from the less restrictive model (∆χ2 = 3.93, df = 1, p < .05), indicating that 
contempt more strongly predicts non-normative action than normative action.  
We repeated these tests for the paths from anger to action tendencies. The model that 
constrained the two non-normative actions to be equal differed significantly from the 
unconstrained model (∆χ2 = 7.88, df = 1, p < .01), indicating that anger had significantly different 
relations to the two forms of non-normative action. We therefore conducted pair wise 
comparisons between paths, which indicated that the relations between anger and action differed 
significantly between all types of action (all ps <.05), such that anger was significantly less 
predictive of action the more extreme the action was.  
Perceived group efficacy was, as expected, positively related to willingness to engage in 
normative action (B = .36, SE = .06, p < .001; CI: .249/.460). The relation between efficacy and 
non-violent, non-normative action was positive and approached significance (B = .12, SE = .07, p 
= .079; CI: -.018/.242). Consistent with our hypothesis, group efficacy was significantly 
negatively related to violent non-normative action (B = -.02, SE = .01, p = .025; CI: -.029/-.004).  
Standardized coefficients are presented in Figure 1. 
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To summarize, these findings present first evidence that different appraisals and emotions 
underlie different forms of collective action. This was primarily apparent when comparing 
normative and violent non-normative actions. As expected, anger was related to normative but 
not to violent non-normative action. Additional tests comparing the relative strength of paths 
further indicated that anger was significantly less predictive the more extreme the action. Thus, it 
seems that for anger there was a continuous diminution of predictive power as a function of 
extremity of criterion action. Overall, these findings are in line with current thinking that anger is 
a constructive emotion which is likely to result in actions that are bound to conventional norms 
and allow for reconciliation (Averill, 1983; Fischer & Roseman, 2007). The present study further 
provided evidence for our hypothesis that contempt would predict non-normative forms of 
action. This link between contempt and non-normative action was only significant for violent 
non-normative action. Thus, contempt, which is often associated with dehumanization and moral 
exclusion of the object of contempt and a lack of reconciliatory intentions (see Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007), may contribute particularly toward extreme collective actions in the context of 
a group-based injustice.  
Furthermore, the present results also present evidence for our second key idea, namely that 
efficacy would be positively related to normative action but negatively related to non-normative 
action. The negative link between efficacy and non-normative action was, however, also only 
evident for violent non-normative actions. Overall, it seems that in the present study the non-
violent, non-normative action category was predicted by similar factors as normative action, 
namely anger (although to a lesser degree) and high efficacy. They therefore seemed to present a 
‘middle category’ in between clearly normative and clearly non-normative action. It is possible 
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that, in the present context, actions such as blocking streets and buildings were seen as legitimate 
and fairly normative and acceptable strategies as many students engaged in these activities. 
Our next study examines our hypotheses further, this time in a different cultural context 
and an environment of enduring inequality and violent intergroup conflict, and in relation to a 
different set of criterion variables. This study was conducted among Muslims in India.  
Study 2 
Muslims constitute India’s largest religious minority of about 13.4 percent of the total 
population (80.5 percent of which is Hindu; Census of India, 2001). They have suffered from 
economic and social disadvantage since India’s partition in 1947 and are now among the most 
disadvantaged communities in the country in terms of education, income, employment and 
political representation (Sachar Committee Report, 2006). Unlike for other disadvantaged 
groups, such as ‘scheduled’ caste Hindus, there are no targeted efforts by the government to 
improve conditions for Muslims. Furthermore, violent riots between Hindu and Muslim 
communities have plagued India with regularity since partition, costing tens of thousands of 
lives. While violence is often incited by Hindu nationalist groups, local inequalities and 
economic competition between communities have undoubtedly played a role (see Singh, 1988, 
for a review). The present study was conducted at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) in Aligarh, 
Uttar Pradesh, where the majority of students and staff are Muslim. Muslims are, however, a 
minority in the town of Aligarh and the university-town relationship has been conflictual. In fact, 
Aligarh is one of the most riot-prone cities in India (see Varshney, 2002).  
In this context we examined Muslim students’ perceptions of Muslim disadvantage, 
emotions in relation to disadvantage and perceived group efficacy as predictors of support for 
different forms of political action. Specifically, we investigated participants’ support for 
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government policies that would address Muslim disadvantage and their attitudes towards the use 
of violence by Muslim groups. It should be noted that while support for political violence clearly 
represents non-normative action as examined in the previous study, support for government 
policies differs conceptually from the measures of normative action used in Study 1. The 
measures of normative action in the previous study represented confrontational actions (actions 
aimed at forcing the government to change policies) using means within the existing political 
system. Support for government policies is, however, not confrontational and does not represent 
collective action as such. It therefore is beyond the scope of the dual pathway model and we 
would not expect anger and ingroup efficacy to predict this attitude. Nonetheless, we decided to 
include this measure as a criterion variable in order to explore whether the same variables that 
foster non-normative action might also predict a psychological distancing from the dominant 
system (i.e., less endorsement of actions proposed or taken by the dominant group).   
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The survey was administered as a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Participants were 
recruited during classes at several departments at AMU. A total of 169 students who self-
identified as Muslims participated. Twelve participants were excluded from our analyses because 
they had missing values for several complete scales. Our final sample thus comprised 157 
participants (82 female, 74 male, 1 unknown) with a mean age of 21.66 (SD = 2.06). The 
questionnaire was administered in English which is widely understood and spoken at AMU. 
Among a number of additional measures pertaining to Hindu-Muslim relations in India, the 
questionnaire included items assessing our key variables.  
Measures 




To assess perceived disadvantage of the ingroup, participants indicated the extent to 
which they agreed with the item “I often think that Hindus are favoured and Muslims 
disadvantaged in India” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
Efficacy  
 Group efficacy was measured by two items (r = .39, p <.001). On scales ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), respondents indicated their agreement with the items “I 
think that Muslims as a group are able to improve their situation” and “Muslims can together 
overcome their difficulties”.  
Anger 
 On scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) respondents indicated the extent to 
which they felt angry, resentful, furious, and displeased when thinking about the disadvantaged 
status of Muslims in India (α = .86). 
Contempt 
 Respondents indicated the extent to which they felt contemptuous when thinking about 
the disadvantaged status of Muslims in India (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely). 
Policy support 
 Support for government policies that would help to raise the status of Muslims in India 
was measured by five items (α = .88). On scales ranging from 1 (strongly reject) to 5 (strongly 
support), respondents indicated their support for (a) job reservation policies for Muslims, (b) 
more government funds to support the Muslim community, (c) more scholarships for Muslim 
groups, (d) more job-related training opportunities for Muslim groups, and (e) government-
funded housing loans for Muslim groups.  
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Support for violence 
Our measure of support for ingroup violence was adopted from Hayes and McAllister 
(2005). Respondents indicated their agreement with three items (α = .83): “In general, I 
understand some Muslim groups’ reasons for the use of violence, even though I do not condone 
the violence itself”; “In general, I have sympathy for some Muslim groups’ reasons to resort to 
violent means in general, even though I do not condone the violence itself”; “In general, I 
support some Muslim groups’ decisions to use violence, even though I do not condone the 
violence itself” (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  
Results and Discussion 
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between key variables are 
presented in Table 2. Because there was a small amount of scattered missing data (≤ 5.7%), we 
again used FIML estimation. Perceived disadvantage of the ingroup significantly predicted both 
feelings of anger (B = .26, SE = .09, p = .005; CI: .077/.436) and contempt (B = .28, SE = .09, p 
= .003; CI: .106/.467). Anger was positively albeit non-significantly related to support for 
government policies to address ingroup disadvantage (B = .14, SE = .08, p = .101; CI: -.030/.299) 
and unrelated to support for violence (B = -.09, SE = .11, p = .410; CI: -.302/.121). In line with 
our hypotheses, contempt was positively related to support for non-normative action (B = .26, SE 
= .10, p = .011; CI: .058/.458). Interestingly, contempt was also significantly negatively related 
to support for government policies (B = -.16, SE = .08, p = .047; CI: -.323/-.012). There were 
significant indirect effects of perceived disadvantage via contempt on both policy support (B = -
.05, SE = .03, p = .112; CI: -.121/-.005) and support for violence (B = .07, SE = .04, p = .059; CI: 
.015/.176). There was also a direct relation between perceived disadvantage and policy support 
(B = .13, SE = .06, p = .049; CI: -.001/.249).  
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 Again, to provide a stronger test of the idea that anger and contempt differentially 
predict normative and non-normative action, we tested whether the differences in predictive 
power of anger and contempt for normative and non-normative action were significant. The more 
restrictive model constraining the paths from contempt to normative and non-normative action to 
be equal differed significantly from the unconstrained model (∆χ2 = 3.93, df = 1, p < .05), 
indicating that contempt differentially predicted normative and non-normative action. The results 
for anger also suggested differences between the prediction of normative and non-normative 
action; however the difference between the constrained and the unconstrained model only 
approached significance in this case (∆χ2 = 3.19, df = 1, p = .074). 
Efficacy was unrelated to policy support (B = .08, SE = .10, p = .403; CI: -.117/.274) and 
negatively (but non-significantly) related to support for non-normative action (B = -.16, SE = .12, 
p = .196; CI: -.379/.084). Given that the two items assessing efficacy were only moderately 
correlated we also repeated the analysis using the single items of efficacy. We obtained a 
negative relation with support for violence that approached statistical significance for the item 
‘Muslims can together overcome their difficulties’ (B = -.19, SE = .11, p = .073, CI: -.40/.02), 
but there was no relation with support for violence for the item ‘I think that Muslims as a group 
are able to improve their situation’ (B = -.04, SE = .10, p = .612, CI: -.24/.14). Standardized 
model coefficients are presented in Figure 2. 
In sum, this study examined our hypotheses in a different cultural context marked by 
enduring inequality and violent intergroup conflict, and in relation to a different set of criterion 
variables. Our hypotheses received mixed support. As predicted, contempt emerged again as a 
significant predictor of non-normative action. Interestingly, contempt was also negatively related 
to support for government policies. As noted earlier, contempt is an emotion that implies 
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psychological distancing from the object of contempt. Thus, it seems that when contempt is felt 
in relation to a political issue, this emotion might be associated with a distancing from the 
political system and lack of endorsement for actions taken by the dominant group. As expected, 
anger was unrelated to non-normative action. The difference between the relations of anger with 
non-normative and anger with normative action approached significance, but anger was overall 
not significantly related to support for government policies. The latter finding is not surprising 
and likely to be due to the nature of the dependent measure, which assessed attitudinal support 
for an action taken by the government (which may be seen as an outgroup) rather than ingroup 
collective action. There was only limited support for our efficacy hypothesis. Although we 
would not expect efficacy to be related to support for government policies, which do not 
represent an action taken by the ingroup, the expected negative relation between efficacy and 
support for violence was not significant. Follow-up analyses, which yielded a negative relation 
between efficacy and support for non-normative action only for one of the two items, suggest 
that this might be due to the nature of the measure. The lack of a significant relation could also 
be due to larger standard errors resulting from the fact that the items were not presented in 
respondents’ first language. Nonetheless, an additional reason for the weak and non-significant 
relation between efficacy and violence support may have been that the target of violence was not 
specified. Thus, the imagined target might have varied across participants, such that some 
participants may have thought about government or military targets of violence, while others 
may have imagined civilian targets. It is likely that the link between low efficacy and violence 
support is stronger when violence is targeted at the government or other agent that is viewed as 
the source of oppression. Our final study examines the role of target of violence more 
specifically by distinguishing between violence against military targets and violence against 
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civilians. This study was conducted in the context of British Muslims’ responses to British 
foreign policy, where political participation and attitudes towards violence have been hotly 
debated in the public and political sphere in the last few years. The study included not just a 
more comprehensive range of criterion variables, but also used a measure of political efficacy 
rather than general group efficacy as a predictor.  
Study 3 
There are approximately 1.6 million Muslims in Britain, making Islam the second largest 
religion in the country (see Peach, 2006). British Muslims have been politically organized and 
active since the 1960s to address issues of racial discrimination and minority rights (see 
Vertovec, 2002). Due to a series of national and international events, including the first Gulf war 
in 1991 and the debate around Muslim faith schools, there was a shift from racially to more 
religiously oriented activism in the 1980s and 1990s. This was accompanied by the emergence of 
Islamist groups that started to have an influence particularly on younger Muslims (see Mizra, 
Senthilkumaran, & Ja’far, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005).  
Recent years have seen a further increase in the level and range of political activism in 
the British Muslim communities (see Briggs, 2010). This renewed interest has been stimulated to 
a large extent by issues surrounding social justice and by British foreign policy towards Muslim 
countries, in particular the Iraq war in 2003 which many Muslims (as well as many non-
Muslims) considered to be illegal (see Briggs, 2010). British foreign policy and the so-called 
‘war on terror’ are also assumed to be among the key drivers of the recruitment of a small 
minority of British Muslims to extremist groups and were cited as the major reasons for the 7/7 
London bombings and a series of subsequent plots and attempted attacks in the UK (e.g., see 
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CBS, 2006; The Independent, 2010). Some findings also suggest that a sizable minority of 
British Muslims felt that the 7/7 bombings were justified (e.g., Populus, 2006; GfK NOP, 2006).  
The purpose of the present study was to examine the appraisals and emotions underlying 
support for normative and non-normative forms of political action in this context. Specifically, 
the current study examines British Muslims’ appraisals of British foreign policies in Muslim 
countries, emotions (anger and contempt) felt in relation to these policies, and efficacy 
perceptions as predictors of willingness to get engaged in normative collective actions and 
attitudes towards violence against both military and civilian targets (i.e., non-normative action). 
We also included a measure of participants’ willingness to vote in the next general election. 
Although voting intention is not directly or exclusively related to attempts to influence foreign 
policy, it is an intriguing dependent variable for two reasons. First of all, voting represents a 
contentious issue within the Muslim community, where some groups argue that voting in Britain 
is un-Islamic and against the teachings of Shari’a law, whereas others emphasize that voting is 
both a civil and religious duty and an important part of integrating into British society (see 
Blogspot, 2010). Secondly, since voting can be viewed as a less confrontational and system-
supporting form of political action, including voting intention as an additional dependent 
variable allows us to test whether the negative link between contempt and support for 
government policies obtained in Study 2 is generally replicable. This would provide more direct 
evidence that contempt is associated with disaffection with, and distancing from, the political 
system.  
Furthermore, because the current study was more generally concerned with views on 
Islam and politics and integration into the British political system, it included a measure of 
political efficacy (e.g., Balch, 1974; Campbell et al., 1954; Verba et al., 1995) rather than general 
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group efficacy as measured in the previous studies. Political efficacy is a theoretical concept in 
political science that represents citizens' faith and trust in government and the belief that they are 
able to influence political affairs. It therefore represents a measure of efficacy that relates more 
specifically to actions within the current political system. Political efficacy was shown to be 
strongly positively related to engagement in a variety of political actions including voting and 
campaign involvement. However, to our knowledge, political efficacy has not yet been examined 
in relation to attitudes towards political violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that in 
particular disenfranchised individuals who have lost trust in the government become attracted to 
more extremist groups (e.g., Glynn, 2002). Thus, we would again predict a negative relation 
between political efficacy and support for non-normative action. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The study was administered as an online survey. Respondents were recruited using an 
advertisement on Facebook which targeted Facebook users living in the United Kingdom and 
aged 18 years or older. To ensure that the advertisement would reach many Muslims, it targeted 
users who had words related to Islam or Muslims (e.g., Islam, Muslims, Arabic, Bangladesh) in 
their profile. The advertisement depicted the British flag and the flag of the Muslim league and 
the question ‘Are you Muslim?’. When clicking on the link respondents were taken to the 
survey. Respondents were given the opportunity to enter into a prize draw at the end of the 
survey. The survey was completed by 473 respondents. Seven respondents who specified that 
they were not Muslims were excluded. Our final sample comprised 466 Muslims living in 
Britain (247 female, 215 male, 4 unknown; mean age = 26.69, SD = 8.10).  
Measures 
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 In addition to a number of measures relating to issues affecting Muslims in Britain, the 
questionnaire contained items assessing our key constructs.  
Injustice appraisals 
Appraisals of (in-)justice of British foreign policies were measured by six items. On 
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), respondents indicated the extent to which they 
felt that British foreign policy in the Middle East, Britain’s role in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
and Britain’s current campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan were illegitimate and immoral 
(α = .93). 
Political efficacy 
The political efficacy items were adapted from established scales (Campbell et al., 1954; 
Craig et al., 1990; Muller & Jukam, 1977). On scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree), respondents indicated their agreement with the following items: “The way 
people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country”; “I feel that I am 
quite well represented in our political system”; “In general, I can rely on the government to do 
the right thing”. The items were averaged to yield an index of political efficacy (α = .64). 
Anger 
On scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely), respondents indicated the extent to 
which they felt anger, outrage, and frustration when thinking about British foreign policy 
towards Muslim countries in the recent past (α = .92). 
Contempt 
Contempt was measured by a single item. Respondents indicated the extent to which they 
felt contempt when thinking about British foreign policy towards Muslim countries in the recent 
past (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). 
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Normative collective action intention 
Respondents indicated how willing they were to engage in the following actions to 
change British foreign policy towards Muslim countries: sign a petition to the government, join 
in a peaceful public rally, protest, or demonstration in support of Muslims, and lobby an MP (1 = 
not at all willing; 9 = very willing). The items were averaged to yield an index of normative 
collective action intentions (α = .80). 
Voting intention 
 Using a scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very likely) respondents indicated how likely 
they thought they were to vote in the next general election. 
Support for violence 
 Attitudes towards violence were measured by seven items related to both attacks against 
military forces in Muslim countries and attacks against civilians in Western countries. 
Respondents indicated the extent to which they can understand the reasons why some groups 
might resort to violence to force Western military forces out of Muslim countries (0 = not at all; 
9 = very much), the extent to which they felt that it is justified for groups to use violence to force 
Western military forces out of Muslim countries (0 = absolutely unjustified; 9 = absolutely 
justified), the extent to which they support or oppose violence by Islamist groups against 
Western military targets in order to stop Western interference in Muslim countries (-5 = strongly 
oppose; 5 = strongly support); the extent to which they support or oppose violence by Islamist 
groups against civilian targets in Western countries to stop Western interference in Muslim 
countries (-5 = strongly oppose; 5 = strongly support), their opinion of British Muslims who 
fight in Muslim countries against western military forces (0 = extremely unfavourable; 9 = 
extremely favourable), the extent to which they can understand why some young British Muslims 
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might have wanted to carry out suicide operations in Britain (0 = not at all; 9 = very much), and 
the extent to which they felt the 2005 London bombings were justified or unjustified (0 = 
absolutely unjustified; 9 = absolutely justified). 
Principal components analysis of these items yielded two components with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 which accounted for 62.46 % of the variance. Loadings, after oblique rotation, 
indicated that items relating to violence against military targets (understanding violence against 
Western military targets, violence against military targets justified, support for violence against 
military targets, opinion of British Muslim fighters) loaded on the first component (>.48) and 
items relating to violence against civilian targets (support for violence against civilian targets, 
understanding British Muslims wanting to carry out suicide bombings in the UK, 7/7 bombings 
justified) loaded on the second component (>.47). The items were standardized and then 
averaged to yield indices of attitudes towards violence against military targets (α = .80) and 
attitudes towards violence against civilian targets (α = .64). Means of unstandardized items are 
presented in Table 3. The index of attitudes towards violence against civilians deviated from 
normality (skewness = 2.07, kurtosis = 4.99) and was transformed with a logarithmic 
transformation before our analyses (skewness = .67, kurtosis = -.46). 
Results and Discussion 
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between key variables are 
presented in Table 4. Again we performed regression analyses in Mplus to test our hypotheses. 
Because there was a small amount of scattered missing data (≤ 7.7%), we again used FIML 
estimation.  
Appraisals of injustice significantly predicted both feelings of anger (B = .43, SE = .05, p 
< .001; CI: .332/.528) and contempt (B = .32, SE = .05, p < .001; CI: .213/.422). Moreover, 
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political efficacy negatively predicted anger (B = -.20, SE = .06, p < .001; CI: -.310/-.092) but 
was not significantly related to contempt (B = -.12, SE = .07, p = .102; CI: -.265/.025). The 
negative relation between political efficacy and anger was unexpected, but is not surprising. It 
suggests that individuals who have low political efficacy (e.g., who do not trust the government 
to do the right thing and feel that they do not have the ability to influence policy decisions) 
respond with more anger to British foreign policy decisions. Anger significantly predicted 
willingness to engage in normative collective action (B = .46, SE = .08, p < .001; CI: .305/.609) 
as well as attitudes towards violence against military targets (B = .12, SE = .03, p < .001; CI: 
.057/.173). Anger was unrelated to voting intention (B = .12, SE = .09, p = .162; CI: -.047/.285) 
and attitudes towards violence against civilians (B = .01, SE = .01, p = .203; CI: -.007/.033). 
Contempt positively predicted both attitudes toward violence against military targets (B = .06, SE 
= .02, p = .021; CI: .009/.100) and attitudes toward violence against civilian targets (B = .02, SE 
= .01, p = .038; CI: .001/.034). Contempt was unrelated to normative collective action intention 
(B = -.01, SE = .06, p = .905; CI: -.137/.118) and negatively (although only approaching 
statistical significance) related to voting intention (B = -.13, SE = .07, p = .074; CI: -.270/.009). 
There was also a direct relation between injustice perceptions and normative collective action 
intention (B = .18, SE = .06, p = .005; CI: .051/.300).  
Again we tested for relative differences between paths from emotions to actions.  
First, we compared a model where the paths for the normative actions (voting and normative 
collective action) and the paths for the two types of non-normative action (violence against 
military and civilian targets) were respectively constrained to be equal with an unconstrained 
model. For contempt, this constrained model did not differ from the unconstrained model (∆χ2 = 
4.50, df = 2, p = .11), suggesting that contempt exerted similar effects on the two types of 
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normative and on the two types of non-normative action, respectively. This model differed 
(although only approaching significance) from a more restrictive model where all four paths 
from contempt to action were constrained to be equal (∆χ2 = 3.58, df = 1, p = .06), suggesting 
again that contempt differentially predicts normative and non-normative action. For anger, the 
model constraining the relations for anger and the two normative actions and anger and the two 
non-normative actions differed significantly from an unconstrained model (∆χ2 = 22.86, df = 2, p 
< .001), indicating that anger had different effects within each type of action (normative and non-
normative). We therefore conducted pair wise comparisons of the effects of anger for each of the 
actions. These comparisons indicated that anger was significantly more strongly related to 
normative collective action than to any of the other forms of action (all ps < .001) and also that 
anger was more strongly related to support for violence against military targets than to violence 
against civilian targets (∆χ2 = 16.13, df = 1, p < .001). There were no significant differences 
between the relation between anger and voting and anger and the two types of violence support. 
Political efficacy positively predicted voting intention (B = .25, SE = .08, p = .003; CI: 
.081/.406) and collective action intention (B = .16, SE = .08, p = .050; CI: -.008/.313) and was 
negatively related to attitudes towards violence against military targets (B = -.06, SE = .03, p = 
.016; CI: -.112/-.013). Political efficacy was, however, unrelated to attitudes towards violence 
against civilian targets (B = -.01, SE = .01, p = .619; CI: -.025/.014). Standardized coefficients 
are presented in Figure 3.  
As expected, injustice perceptions were significantly indirectly related to action via 
emotions. There were indirect effects of injustice appraisals on normative collective action 
intention (B = .20, SE = .04, p < .001; CI: .127/.286) and attitudes towards violence against 
military targets (B = .05, SE = .01, p < .001; CI: .025/.080) via anger, and on attitudes towards 
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violence against military targets (B = .02, SE = .01, p = .037; CI: .003/.036) and attitudes towards 
violence against civilian targets (B = .01, SE = .00, p = .058; CI: .001/.012) via contempt. There 
were also significant indirect effects of political efficacy on collective action intention (B = -.09, 
SE = .03, p = .006; CI: -.165/-.040) and attitudes towards violence against military targets (B = -
.02, SE = .01, p = .009; CI: -.046/-.009) via anger. 
To summarize, this study provided additional evidence for our main hypotheses. 
Supporting our predictions, contempt was again positively related to support for more extreme, 
non-normative actions. Thus, British Muslims who felt contempt in response to British foreign 
policy were more likely to support (or less likely to oppose) violence against both military and 
civilian targets. There was also a negative relation between contempt and voting intention, 
providing some additional evidence for the idea that contempt in response to an injustice 
committed against the ingroup may be accompanied by a distancing from the political system. 
Consistent with previous research, anger predicted willingness to engage in normative collective 
action, but was also related to support for violence against military targets, but not violence 
against civilian targets. Political efficacy was, as in previous research, a positive predictor of 
normative collective action intentions and voting intention. In line with our hypothesis, political 
efficacy was negatively related to support against military targets. This finding indicates that the 
politically apathetic, who have little faith that they can influence governmental functioning and 
are disaffected from the political system, believing it ignores their interests, are more likely to 
support violence. There was, however, no relation between political efficacy and attitudes 
towards violence against civilians. This could be because of restricted variance for this variable, 
but also because other factors, such as adherence to an extremist ideology, play a greater role. 
Unlike in the previous studies, efficacy was negatively related to anger in response to British 
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foreign policy. Although this relation was not specifically hypothesized, it seems plausible given 
the nature of the efficacy measure. If people feel they are well-represented in the political system 
and that the system is responsive to their concerns, they have less reason to feel angry about 
policy decisions.  
Overall, the present study provided additional support for our theoretical ideas in a 
context of a disenfranchised group, considering a wider range of forms of political engagement, 
and using an index of political efficacy which represents the likely impact of actions within the 
current political system more specifically. This study therefore further supports the 
generalizability and robustness of our theoretical ideas.  
General Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to expand on existing work on collective action, which 
has paid relatively little attention to the factors underlying more radical, non-normative group-
based actions. To this end we extended a recent integrative model (van Zomeren et al., 2004) and 
tested several novel ideas regarding the relations between emotion, efficacy and normative and 
non-normative action, across three diverse political contexts. In the following sections we will 
first evaluate our results in relation to our key predictions and suggest directions for further 
research on these ideas. We will then draw attention to a number of limitations of our research 
and finally highlight theoretical contributions and practical implications of our findings.   
The Role of Emotions in Normative and Non-Normative Collective Action: Anger vs. Contempt 
 Our first main idea suggested that qualitatively different emotions would predict 
normative and non-normative action. Based on recent research on the functional differences 
between anger and contempt (Fischer & Roseman, 2007), we proposed that anger would be 
primarily related to normative action while contempt would primarily predict non-normative 
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action. We also hypothesized that both these emotions would be predicted by appraisals of 
injustice, and that injustice perceptions would therefore be indirectly linked to normative and 
non-normative collective action via anger and contempt, respectively.  
 Consistent with our hypothesis, and with previous research on the role of anger in 
collective action (see van Zomeren et al., 2008), anger emerged as a significant predictor of 
willingness to engage in normative collective action both in the context of student protests in 
Germany (Study 1) and British Muslims’ responses to British foreign policy (Study 3). Study 2 
suggested, however, that anger is not a significant predictor of support for normative action taken 
by another agent (in this case the government). Rather, support for normative action was directly 
predicted by injustice appraisals in this case. This suggests that anger might be particularly 
pertinent in motivating own action or support for ingroup action and less predictive if it comes to 
attitudinal support for action taken by other agents or outgroups.  
Our hypothesis that anger would be less predictive of non-normative action was generally 
supported. The finding that anger does not play much of a role in more extreme forms of action 
might, at first sight, seem counter-intuitive and inconsistent with some previous work. Relative 
deprivation theorists (e.g., Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970) have, for example, long ascribed a central 
role of anger-related emotions in driving political movements and revolutions. Furthermore, 
some empirical findings suggest a positive link between anger and more extreme, non-normative 
forms of political action (e.g., Livingstone et al., 2009). It should be noted however that this 
work did not control for contempt and we can therefore not exclude the possibility that the 
reported relation between anger and non-normative action was due to anger’s shared variance 
with contempt. Moreover, work on the frustration-aggression link (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989), which 
has generally suggested a link between anger and aggressive and destructive behaviour, might 
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also on the surface seem as conflicting with our findings. This work has, however, focused more 
on the negative arousal associated with in situ anger and frustration and the impulsive aggressive 
behaviours that follow, rather than the relation between the appraisal component of anger and 
instrumental forms of action examined here.  
Our findings are, however, wholly in line with a view of anger as a constructive emotion 
that occurs in close relationships and functions to correct wrongdoing and uphold moral 
standards (see Averill, 1983; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Weber, 2004). This work has also 
shown that anger mostly results in actions that have beneficial consequences for social relations 
and make reconciliation possible (Averill, 1983; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Weber, 2004). In the 
context of political action, this means that people who feel angry about an unjust treatment still 
feel connected to the political system and therefore are more likely to engage in and support 
action within the confines of the system.  
It should be noted, however, that two of our findings are not entirely consistent with the 
idea that anger is not involved in non-normative forms of action. In Study 1 anger predicted 
more moderate, non-violent non-normative forms of action and in Study 3 anger was positively 
associated with support for violence by Islamist groups against Western military targets. It is 
possible that respondents might have seen these actions as normative in the given contexts. For 
example, violence against military targets could be seen as a legitimate strategy in a context of 
war such Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, blocking streets and buildings as part of the protest 
against tuition fees might have been seen as a legitimate strategy for German students at that 
point in time where many students engaged in these activities. However, our tests of relative 
strength of paths from anger to different forms of action also suggest that there a continuous 
diminution of the predictive power of anger as the criterion actions become more extreme and 
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less normative. This was evident in both Study 1 and Study 3. In Study 1 anger is most predictive 
of normative action, moderately predictive of non-violent, non-normative action such as 
blocking streets and buildings, and least predictive of violent action. Similarly in Study 3 anger 
most strongly predicts willingness to engage in normative action, less strongly predicts support 
for violence against military targets, and least strongly support for violence against civilians 
(Anger was unrelated to voting but this was expected as voting did not relate directly to the 
injustice). Future research may examine role of anger in predicting different forms of collective 
action further, investigating, for example, whether different forms of anger (see Russell & Fehr, 
1994) have differential implications for different forms of action. 
The findings regarding our hypothesis that contempt would be a predictor of non-
normative action were highly consistent across the three studies. In line with our predictions, 
feelings of contempt positively predicted likelihood to engage in violent non-normative action in 
the context of German student protests (Study 1), support for political violence among Indian 
Muslims (Study 2) and support for violence against both military and civilian targets among 
British Muslims (Study 3). To our knowledge, the present research is the first to provide 
evidence for this link. These findings are generally in line with the suggestion that contempt may 
be associated with particularly hostile reactions because attack tendencies are not held in check 
by a desire to preserve social relationships (Fischer & Roseman 2007), and because the 
accompanying derogation and moral exclusion can serve to legitimize extreme actions against an 
offender. The results are also consistent with the idea that contempt, which implies a 
psychological distancing from its object, should play a key role in predicting action which 
challenges the legitimacy of the current political system and seeks radical social change and 
reorganization. This interpretation is also in line with our findings in Studies 2 and 3 indicating 
Emotion and Efficacy Routes to Normative and Non-normative Collective Action  
 
40
that contempt is negatively related to actions that might be seen as system-supporting (support 
for government policies and voting). Thus, feelings of contempt in a political context might 
signal disaffection from the political system more generally. These results underline the 
importance of examining this emotion as a determinant of various forms of political (in)action.  
As hypothesized, both anger and contempt were predicted by perceptions of injustice, and 
injustice appraisals were significantly indirectly related to normative and non-normative 
collective action via these emotions. While the role of injustice appraisals is central in appraisal 
theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989) and models of political action (e.g., Gurr, 1970; 
Runciman, 1966; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005), we believe that it is 
imperative that future research further investigates the contextual and psychological factors that 
determine whether injustice appraisals result in anger or contempt. Some research implies that 
anger and contempt result from different forms of norm violation (e.g., violations of autonomy 
vs. community, respectively; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), while other work suggests 
that anger and contempt can result from the same incidences. Fischer and Roseman (2007) 
showed for example that contempt often arises when prior incidents of anger went unresolved 
and there is a perceived lack of control over the other person. In the domain of group-based 
injustices and political action, this suggests that contempt may evolve when previous attempts to 
address an injustice were futile. Repeated violations of human moral standards by the 
government or other powerful group, such as discounting numerous civilian casualties as 
‘collateral damage’ in a conflict, are also likely to provide a fertile ground for the development 
of (political) contempt.  
Fischer and Roseman (2007) also demonstrated that contempt (compared to anger) is 
more likely to occur in less intimate relationships. This suggests that the perceptions of, and 
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value placed on, relationships or identities might determine whether people respond to an 
injustice with anger or contempt. Thus, contempt may be preceded or accompanied by 
disidentification from the political system or disaffection from society more generally and a 
sense of belonging to, or identification with, a superordinate group or political entity might 
determine whether an experienced injustice is responded to with anger or contempt. 
Another intriguing possibility is that there are individual differences in the propensity to 
respond with contempt and the willingness to engage in violent, hostile behaviour. Recent 
research has demonstrated that individual differences in responding with particular emotions 
partly explain prejudicial reactions to certain outgroups (see Hodson & Costello, 2007). Future 
research could explore whether such individual propensities also play a role in determining 
emotional reactions to political events and willingness to engage in different forms of political 
action. 
The Role of Efficacy Appraisals in Predicting Normative and Non-Normative Collective Action 
Our second extension of the literature was related to the role of perceived efficacy in 
predicting collective action. Specifically, we hypothesized that efficacy would be positively 
associated with normative collective action tendencies but negatively with non-normative action. 
Our findings were generally consistent with these hypotheses. While a vast amount of work has 
previously shown a positive relation between efficacy and (normative) action (see van Zomeren 
et al., 2008), our empirical evidence for the negative link between efficacy and non-normative 
action is novel. It suggests that engagement in, and endorsement of, non-normative collective 
action such as violence and terrorism is greater the lower the perceived efficacy of the ingroup to 
redress an injustice.  
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This finding is significant in that is goes against traditional thinking in the literature that 
collective action primarily happens in unstable social systems (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and is 
driven by high efficacy beliefs (van Zomeren et al., 2008). It is, however, consistent with recent 
theoretical extensions of SIT that suggest that more confrontational, non-normative action 
strategies are chosen under desperate conditions, such as when low status is stable (Scheepers et 
al., 2006; Spears et al., 2010) or when legitimate channels to achieve social change are closed 
(Wright et al., 1990a). This finding also resonates with the terrorism literature which stresses the 
role of powerlessness against state power in driving such action (e.g., Moghaddam, 2005).    
As we have suggested earlier, the fact that low group efficacy predicts non-normative 
action does not imply that non-normative action is an irrational strategy. Non-normative action 
can be highly strategic, and can fulfil a number of short-term goals that contribute towards 
achieving the desired social change in the long run (see Hornsey at al., 2006). For example, in an 
analysis of Al-Qaeda strategy, Sedgwick (2004) suggests that the purpose of the 9/11 attacks was 
to provoke a counter-attack from the US that would then have a radicalizing effect on Al-
Qaeda’s constituency (which it did). The attainment of this short-term political goal might then 
increase the likelihood of achieving the ultimately desired goal of uniting Muslims under a pan-
Islamic state. Sageman (2004) similarly described how Egyptian Islamic Jihad used violence to 
provoke ever more repressive measures by the government which would then alienate the 
general population and mobilize them against the regime. To explore the strategic side of non-
normative action further, we suggest that future research specifically examines the efficacy of 
different forms of action (i.e., action efficacy; see Saab et al., 2010, for initial research). As we 
discussed earlier, low group efficacy can stem from the fact that people feel that their group does 
not have access to the conventional channels of political influence (e.g., Wright, 2009; Wright et 
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al., 1990a), is marginalized by the procedures of the existing political system (Gurr, 1993; 
Schwarzmantel, 2010), or is too disorganized or unsupportive of the cause to bring about the 
mass action required to effect change with means within the system (see van Zomeren et al., 
2004). Thus, it is possible that our measures of group efficacy in Studies 1 and 2 may have 
evoked normative action strategies. Study 3, which examined political efficacy, a concept that 
refers more specifically to the efficacy of actions within the system, suggests that the efficacy of 
normative actions is negatively related to support for violence. We suggest that future work 
should additionally examine the efficacy of violent actions and explore the interactions between 
the perceived efficacy of different forms of action. We would like to point out, however, that this 
does not mean that general group efficacy is irrelevant as a predictor. As our results show, there 
is a meaningful negative relation between group efficacy and non-normative action, indicating 
that the more general collective strength a group has, the less likely it will need to resort to 
extreme or violent measures. While efficacy measured generally may well be associated with the 
efficacy of normative action, and the efficacy of non-normative action might be a more specific 
and positive predictor, a key psychological point is that these two forms of efficacy will often be 
negatively related. Future work might therefore also examine the interplay of general group 
efficacy and specific forms of action efficacy.  
It is also important that future research distinguishes different forms of efficacy (e.g., the 
efficacy of an action in gaining public support; see Hornsey et al., 2006). Such work would shed 
more light onto the strategic logic of non-normative action and provide vital insights into when 
and why non-normative action becomes an attractive option. Furthermore, in line with much 
previous work on collective action (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2004), the 
present research focused on the efficacy of the ingroup in general (e.g., students, Muslims). We 
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suggest that future research also takes into account the perceived efficacy of specific politicized 
subgroups or vanguard groups. It is likely that individuals who view the ingroup as a whole (e.g., 
Muslims) as weak and ineffective might become involved in non-normative activities when they 
view a certain vanguard group (e.g., al-Qaeda) as strong and effective in redressing group-based 
injustices (see Husain, 2007). In fact, militant extremist groups often portray their groups as the 
only effective agent to bring about the desired change (see Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller, 
Knezevic, & Stankov, 2009). Thus it is likely that it is the perceived efficacy of such militant 
subgroups that makes these groups attractive to disaffected individuals (see also our discussion 
on the role of identification below). Thus, we would expect a positive relation between the 
efficacy of such militant subgroups and support for, and engagement in, non-normative action 
(see also Louis, 2009, for similar arguments).  
Limitations of the Present Research 
We acknowledge several limitations of our studies. The focus of our analyses was on the 
predictive roles of several theoretically relevant variables and our regression approach allowed 
us to isolate the contributions of these variables in predicting normative and non-normative 
action support. It is important to note, however, that our reliance on cross-sectional data 
precludes inferences about the causal relations between these variables and does not allow us to 
rule out the influence of third variables that were not directly controlled for. This is a common 
problem in field research on collective action (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999; Pennekamp et al., 
2007), which does not easily lend itself to experimentation. Our analyses were, however, guided 
by established theory and prior research. There is, for example, solid experimental evidence for 
the causal role of efficacy and injustice in predicting collective action tendencies (e.g., van 
Zomeren et al., 2004; Wright et al., 1990), and the causal role of injustice in predicting emotions 
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(Weis et al., 1999). Nonetheless, the causal relations between variables are also likely to be 
reciprocal and some variables such as emotions and action tendencies are likely to arise more or 
less simultaneously, as suggested by appraisal theories of emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). 
Thus, conceptualizing a strict causal order between variables might be counterproductive. 
However, we can of course not preclude the possibility that, for example, non-normative action 
tendencies or support are legitimized by invoking the injustice of a situation, the low efficacy of 
the group in achieving the desired social change, and the contempt-worthiness of the opponent. It 
is therefore imperative that future longitudinal and experimental work corroborates our findings. 
Furthermore, like most research on collective action (see van Zomeren et al., 2008), we 
relied on behavioural intentions and action support as our criterion variables. Although previous 
research has shown that behavioural intentions are a proxy for actual behaviour and predict 
actual participation in collective action (e.g., De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2009; Webb & Sheeran, 2006), and that attitudes towards different forms of action in 
a community can predict actual action such as terrorism (Krueger & Malečková, 2009), it would 
be desirable that future research further strengthens the present findings by investigating actual 
participation in normative and non-normative collective action. Based on previous findings we 
would expect similar (albeit potentially smaller; see van Zomeren et al., 2008) relations between 
our explanatory variables and actual participation.  
We would also like to emphasize that the current work does not represent a complete 
analysis of the factors underlying normative and non-normative action. As our main purpose was 
to extend an established theoretical model (van Zomeren et al., 2004), we focused on efficacy 
and emotion as proximal predictors of normative and non-normative action tendencies. A 
number of other relevant factors, such as characteristics of the social structure (e.g., 
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permeability; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or a salient social identity, were assumed rather than 
specifically assessed and integrated into our analysis. It is therefore likely that other variables 
will further contribute, mediate, or moderate the relations tested in the present work. For 
example, identification with a disadvantaged group is likely to be a distal predictor, such that, 
individuals who identify more strongly with their group would be more likely to appraise an 
event that disadvantages the ingroup as unjust (see van Zomeren et al., 2008). Identification 
could also moderate the link between injustice appraisals and emotions, such that high identifiers 
react more strongly emotionally to injustices committed against the ingroup. Moreover, the 
presence of an injustice can politicize identities (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and 
identification with a politicized subgroup is likely to mediate the relations between our 
explanatory variables and forms of collective action (see Stürmer & Simon, 2004). For example, 
individuals who perceive the ingroup as ineffective or who have lost faith in, and feel contempt 
for, the political system might become attracted to politicized groups who provide an ideology 
that undermines the dominant system and legitimizes the use of non-normative means to redress 
group-based injustices, for example by dehumanizing the enemy outgroup and presenting the 
ingroup as virtuous and as fighting the spread of evil (Saucier et al., 2009). Identification with 
such groups might then proximally predict engagement in non-normative action.  
Contributions and Implications of the Present Research 
Despite these limitations, we believe that the present research makes a number of valuable 
contributions to the literature. To our knowledge, the current studies present the thus far most 
detailed empirical investigation of the factors underlying non-normative forms of collective 
action. By demonstrating that support for non-normative action is associated with low rather than 
high efficacy and that contempt rather than anger predicts such action (cf. van Zomeren et al., 
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2004), this research clearly advances current thinking and theory on the roles of emotions and 
efficacy in predicting collective action. Our findings further underline the importance of testing 
theoretical models of collective action in relation to a variety of actions. The fact that our 
predictions were generally confirmed across three very diverse political contexts and in relation 
to a variety of criterion variables speaks for the robustness of our theoretical ideas and affords 
confidence in the generalizability of our results.  
An investigation of the predictors of non-normative action is particularly timely given the 
resurgence of interest in issues relating to understanding and addressing violent forms of political 
action among both academics (see Victoroff & Kruglanski, 2009) and policy makers (e.g., see 
Schwarzmantel, 2010). Our research answers recent calls to utilize insights from the collective 
action and social movements literature to understand terrorism (see Beck, 2008) and to provide a 
more detailed examination of the role of emotions in the etiology of political violence (Rice, 
2009; Wright-Neville & Smith, 2009). Counter to common beliefs that anger is a destructive 
force in intergroup conflict and plays a central role in extreme forms of action such as terrorism 
(e.g., ‘Islamic anger’; see Rice, 2009), our findings suggest that anger is in fact more strongly 
related to normative forms of political action and that it is contempt which is likely to drive non-
normative action. This underlines the importance of conducting theory-driven, empirical research 
to inform the discourse on terrorism. This is particularly important given that only 3% of 
academic articles on terrorism present empirical data and the majority of counterterrorism 
programs are based on unscientific assumptions (see Lum, et al., 2004). 
Our findings also speak directly to current debates in many liberal democracies about the 
likely causes of, and effective responses to, violent forms of political action such as terrorism. In 
theory, democracy should make violence unnecessary because all individuals and groups can 
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express their views and interests (Schwarzmantel, 2010). In practice, however, equal access to 
democratic channels of influence for all groups, in particular minority groups, is not always 
achieved in a system of majority rule. For groups who feel that they are excluded from the 
political system and denied an equal hearing, non-normative action and violence can become the 
most attractive option of political engagement (see Schwarzmantel, 2010). Consistent with this 
view, our findings suggest that more extreme forms of action are supported among those who 
have a low sense of efficacy and who feel contempt, an emotion that often develops when anger 
remains unaddressed (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).  
Our results also indicate that normative forms of action tendencies are based on different 
set of appraisals of the political situation (see also Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Specifically, 
normative actions are associated with a sense of high efficacy and (healthy) anger. This suggests 
that people engaging in or supporting normative action feel connected to, and represented by, the 
system, and that normative forms of activism should therefore be viewed as expressions of the 
health of the system rather than as threats to it (see Briggs, 2010). The crucial question thus is 
how to promote normative forms of action and reduce the attractiveness of non-normative forms 
of engagement. The answer is likely to lie in the responses of the state to both normative and 
non-normative political action. Movements that challenge the current political order through the 
use of non-normative means such as violence are often met with counter-violence or excessive 
measures such as surveillance and stop-and-search that disproportionately target minority 
groups. These measures are said to defend democracy but in reality restrain the very freedoms 
democracy aims to protect and further fuel discontent and alienation among affected groups. 
Further dangers lie in not addressing the concerns of minority groups expressed via normative 
channels, which is likely to reduce political efficacy and breed contempt for the political system. 
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This is surely what happened to many Muslims (and non-Muslims) after widespread collective 
action against the Iraq war was ignored by the political elite. Thus, the challenges faced by 
policy makers lie in creating inclusive political institutions that provide minority groups with the 
means to participate in the democratic decision making process (see Schwarzmantel, 2010), thus 
raising political efficacy and preventing disaffection with, and contempt for, the existing political 
system.   
Conclusion 
The present research fills an important gap in the literature by systematically examining 
the appraisals and emotions associated with different forms of collective action. We provide 
evidence that qualitatively different emotions underlie normative and non-normative forms of 
collective action and that, unlike normative collective action, non-normative action is likely to be 
driven by a sense of low rather than high efficacy. Together these findings suggest that non-
normative actions are chosen by the disaffected and powerless. Our findings have important 
implications for established theoretical models of collective action and speak to current debates 
about the causes of, and effective responses to, violent forms of political action such as terrorism. 
We hope that the present article inspires future social-psychological research on these important 
issues and facilitates theoretical development in the field. 
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Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 1) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Perceived injustice 1 – 7  5.46 1.71 - .38*** .78*** .40*** .59*** .36*** .03 
2. Group efficacy 1 – 7  4.19 1.47  - .34*** .19** .48*** .23*** -.10+ 
3. Anger 1 – 7  5.11 1.89   - .47*** .62*** .38*** .02 
4. Contempt 1 – 7  2.54 1.69    - .29*** .28*** .16** 
5. Normative action  1 – 7  4.20 1.80     - .58*** .09 
6. Non-violent non-normative action  1 – 7  2.93 1.78      - .40*** 
7. Violent non-normative action$ 1 – 7  1.13 .61       - 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; +p < .10. $ Correlations were computed using the transformed scores.
Emotion and Efficacy Routes to Normative and Non-normative Collective Action  
 
64
    Table 2 
Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 2) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Perceived disadvantage 1 – 5  3.60 1.06 - .05 .28*** .25** .17* .18* 
2. Group efficacy 1 – 5  3.89 .75  - .03 .07 .07 -.10 
3. Anger 1 – 5  3.06 1.13   - .68*** .08 .11 
4. Contempt 1 – 5  2.97 1.20    - -.05 .26** 
5. Policy support 1 – 5  3.94 .83     - .04 
6. Support for violence 1 – 5  2.97 1.04      - 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.  
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    Table 3 
Descriptives for Support for Violence Items (Study 3) 
 Scale M SD 
Violence against Military Targets    
Understand violence to force Western military forces out of Muslim countries 0 – 9  5.86 2.78 
Violence to force Western military forces out of Muslim countries justified 0 – 9  4.74 3.08 
Support for violence against Western military targets -5 – +5 -.56 3.48 
Attitudes towards British Muslims fighting against Western military -5 – +5 -.84 3.31 
Violence against Civilian Targets    
Support for violence against civilian targets in the West -5 – +5 -3.99 2.26 
Understand why British Muslims might want to carry out suicide bombings 0 – 9  2.52 3.04 
7/7 London bombings justified 0 – 9  .77 1.95 




Descriptives and Zero-order Correlations among Key Variables (Study 3) 
 Scale M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Perceived injustice 1-7 4.88 1.92 - -.17*** .49*** .31*** .04 .29*** .26*** .03 
2. Political efficacy 1-7 3.56 1.30  - -.24*** -.13** .11* -.03 -.21*** -.06 
3. Anger 1-7 4.90 1.79   - .63*** .02 .39*** .40*** .11* 
4. Contempt 1-7 4.07 2.02    - -.05 .24*** .34*** .15** 
5. Voting intention 1-9 4.85 2.37     - 22*** -.04 -.03 
6. Normative collective action  1-9 6.50 2.37      - .26*** .01 
7. Support for violence (military) Stand. -.01 .80       - .32*** 
8. Support for violence (civilians) $ Stand. -.00 .76        - 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. $ Correlations were computed using the transformed score. 




Figure 1. Results of multiple regression analysis conducted with Mplus (Study 1, N = 332). Path 
coefficients are standardized estimates. Unless otherwise noted, solid paths indicate 
significant effects based on 95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals.        
+ denotes effects approaching statistical significance (p <.10). The analysis controls for 
age and gender. 
 
Figure 2. Results of multiple regression analysis conducted with Mplus (Study 2, N = 156). Path 
coefficients are standardized estimates. Unless otherwise noted, solid paths indicate 
significant effects based on 95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals.        
+ denotes effects approaching statistical significance (p <.10). The analysis controls for 
age, gender, and socio-economic status. 
 
Figure 3. Results of multiple regression analysis conducted with Mplus (Study 3, N = 466). Path 
coefficients are standardized estimates. Unless otherwise noted, solid paths indicate 
significant effects based on 95% bias-corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals.        
+ denotes effects approaching statistical significance (p <.10). The analysis controls for 
age, gender, and socio-economic status. 
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